{
  "id": "CVE-2026-91012",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-91012",
  "published_at": "2026-09-29T08:34:11.409Z",
  "title": "Apache Karaf: Path Traversal in Config Service Allows Manager-to-Admin Privilege Escalation",
  "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
  "product": "Apache Karaf",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 9.8,
    "source": "cisa-adp",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),\nwhich backs the \"config\" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file\nit writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that\nthe result stays inside ${karaf.etc}:\n\n  *  if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;\n  *  otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + \".cfg\")), so a PID containing \"..\" segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.\n\n\nBoth code paths are reachable by any caller holding the \"manager\" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: \"update = manager\"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to \"admin\" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains(\"..\") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.",
  "cwe": "CWE-22",
  "cpes": [
    "cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
  ],
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cisa-adp": 9.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
        "product": "Apache Karaf",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c 4.4.12"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.4.12"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade Apache Karaf to 4.4.12 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
