{
  "id": "CVE-2026-90833",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-90833",
  "published_at": "2026-11-10T22:07:42.603Z",
  "title": "Signed offset bypasses bounds check in simulated EEPROM driver, allowing out-of-bounds kernel memory read and write from user mode",
  "vendor": "zephyrproject",
  "product": "zephyr",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.8,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "The simulated EEPROM driver validated access ranges in eeprom_range_is_valid() (drivers/eeprom/eeprom_simulator.c) with a single test, (offset + len) \u003c= config-\u003esize. Because offset is a signed off_t and len an unsigned size_t of the same rank, the addition is evaluated in unsigned arithmetic: a negative offset combined with a compensating len wraps the sum back into the accepted range. eeprom_sim_read() and eeprom_sim_write() then memcpy() through the EEPROM(addr) macro, which is plain pointer arithmetic on the driver's static mock_eeprom array, so the copy addresses memory located before that array.\n\neeprom_read() and eeprom_write() are __syscall entry points, and their verification handlers in drivers/eeprom/eeprom_handlers.c check only the device object and the caller's own data buffer (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE) — the offset argument is passed to the driver unvalidated. With CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a CONFIG_EEPROM_SIMULATOR device instance, and the device object granted to a user thread (the usage the in-tree tests/drivers/eeprom/api suite exercises from ZTEST_USER threads), an unprivileged thread could supply a negative offset and have the kernel perform the copy on its behalf.\n\nThe result is an out-of-bounds read of kernel .bss returned into the caller's buffer and, via the write path, an out-of-bounds write of caller-supplied bytes over kernel memory preceding mock_eeprom. Both the start address and the length of the affected span are attacker-selected, so the primitive is sufficient to corrupt adjacent kernel state and escape the user-mode sandbox. Exposure is limited to builds that instantiate the simulated EEPROM (status = \"okay\" by default on qemu_x86 and native_sim, otherwise added by a devicetree overlay) together with userspace isolation.\n\nThe fix rejects negative offsets and performs the remaining bound check without overflow.",
  "cwe": "CWE-787",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "zephyrproject",
        "product": "zephyr",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 2.2.0, \u003c 4.3.2",
          "\u003e= 4.4.0, \u003c 4.5.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.3.2",
          "4.5.0"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.5.0 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/ce2ec9b3a34d71f52f5d1d7491b91393e334713e"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-vf6j-hcx8-44vh"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
