{
  "id": "CVE-2026-90591",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-90591",
  "published_at": "2026-11-09T22:04:03.975Z",
  "title": "NXP ENET-QOS Ethernet driver re-arms RX descriptors with a clobbered DMA buffer address on packet drop",
  "vendor": "zephyrproject",
  "product": "zephyr",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.5,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "The NXP ENET-QOS Ethernet driver's receive work handler eth_nxp_enet_qos_rx() in drivers/ethernet/eth_nxp_enet_qos hands each processed descriptor back to the DMA by writing desc-\u003eread.control = rx_desc_refresh_flags, which sets OWN_FLAG and BUF1_ADDR_VALID_FLAG. RDES0 of a receive descriptor is the DMA buffer address in read format, but the hardware write-back aliases that word with the VLAN tag fields (or, for a context descriptor, the timestamp low word), so it is destroyed on every completion. The success path rewrites desc-\u003eread.buf1_addr before re-arming; the four drop paths — errored or non-first descriptor, net_pkt_rx_alloc() failure, invalid descriptor length, and net_pkt_get_frag() failure — did not, re-arming the ring slot with the write-back residue as its DMA target address.\n\nThe drop paths are driven entirely by received traffic and need no privilege or special configuration. With the defaults for this driver (CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE of 128 and 16 receive descriptors) a single full-size frame consumes twelve ring slots and twelve K_NO_WAIT fragment allocations, so a short burst of frames sent to the device exhausts the receive pools and reaches the allocation-failure paths; a frame with a receive error, or any frame whose first descriptor was already dropped, reaches the non-first-descriptor path.\n\nOnce a slot has been poisoned, the DMA writes the next frame received in that slot to an address derived from the frame's VLAN tag fields rather than to a receive buffer. On the supported MCX SoCs that address falls in flash or reserved space, so the transfer raises a fatal bus error that the driver only logs — there is no reset or recovery path — and reception stops permanently until the device is rebooted; where the write is silently discarded instead, the untouched buffer is later handed to the network stack with a length, delivering stale buffer contents as if they were a received frame. A single triggering event is enough to make the condition persistent, so an attacker able to send traffic to the device can permanently disable its network interface.",
  "cwe": "CWE-787",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.5
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "zephyrproject",
        "product": "zephyr",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 4.2.0, \u003c 4.3.2",
          "\u003e= 4.4.0, \u003c 4.5.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.3.2",
          "4.5.0"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.5.0 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/9efd144a4ab0f37311f7b5e5ed0967f5a8d2f910"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-pm7x-98w8-92pm"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
