{
  "id": "CVE-2026-89762",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-89762",
  "published_at": "2026-09-11T19:47:03.601Z",
  "title": "apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()",
  "vendor": "Linux",
  "product": "Linux",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.8,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()\n\nAppArmor's begin_current_label_crit_section() is a scary function called\nfrom lots of LSM hooks (in particular VFS/socket-related ones) that checks\nif the label referenced by the current creds is marked FLAG_STALE, and if\nso, attempts to use aa_replace_current_label() to replace the creds with an\nupdated version that uses a new label.\n\nThe first problem with this is that it would directly lead to UAF of\n`struct cred` if anything in the kernel takes a pointer to the current\ncreds and accesses these past a security hook invocation that replaces\ncreds, like so:\n```\nconst struct cred *cred = current_cred();\nalloc_file_pseudo(...);\nuid_t uid = cred-\u003eeuid;\n```\nI don't know if anything in the kernel actually does this, but I think it\nis very surprising that this pattern could lead to UAF.\n\nThe second problem is that things go wrong when aa_replace_current_label()\nruns with overridden credentials. aa_replace_current_label() bails out if\n`current_cred() != current_real_cred()` (mirroring the check in\nproc_pid_attr_write()), but this check can't actually reliably detect\noverridden credentials because the overridden creds can be the same as the\nobjective creds.\n\nSo in approximately the following scenario, things go wrong:\n\n1. task begins with \u003ccreds A\u003e (as both objective and subjective creds),\n   with refcount=2\n2. task grabs an extra reference on \u003ccreds A\u003e for overriding\n3. task calls override_creds(\u003ccreds A\u003e), which returns a pointer to the old\n   subjective creds (\u003ccreds A\u003e)\n4. task enters AppArmor LSM hook\n5. AppArmor checks that objective/subjective creds are equal\n6. AppArmor replaces both cred pointers with \u003ccreds B\u003e and drops 2 refs on\n   \u003ccreds A\u003e\n7. task leaves AppArmor LSM hook\n8. task calls revert_creds(\u003ccreds A\u003e)\n9. now task-\u003ecred is \u003ccreds A\u003e while task-\u003ereal_cred is \u003ccreds B\u003e, but the\n   task_struct logically holds two references to \u003ccreds B\u003e\n10. another task drops the extra reference on \u003ccreds A\u003e that was used for\n    overriding, refcount drops to 0\n11. now task-\u003ereal_cred points to freed creds\n\nAt this point, any access to current_cred() will be UAF.\n\nI have a test case where I run aa-disable on a profile while a process\nusing that profile is blocked on splice() from a FUSE passthrough file into\na full pipe; after the profile update, the pipe becomes empty, splice()\nresumes, the credentials go out of sync, and a subsequent getuid() syscall\nresults in a KASAN UAF splat.\n\nTo fix this, instead of directly replacing creds, do it via task_work that\nwill run at the end of the current syscall. (The point in time at which the\ncred replacement happens should have no correctness impact; it is just a\nperformance optimization to avoid unnecessarily touching the refcount of\nthe new label.)\n\nNote that AppArmor still performs direct cred replacements in the\nsb_pivotroot LSM hook after this change, and that direct cred replacements\ncan still happen in VFS -\u003ewrite() callbacks via proc_pid_attr_write().\n\nThere are two options for what to do with aa_dup_task_ctx(): Either\nexplicitly reset new-\u003elabel_replacement_pending after the entire\naa_task_ctx has been copied, or switch to manually copying members over.\nI am switching to manually copying members over because that should make\nbugs more obvious.",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "Linux",
        "product": "Linux",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= c75afcd153f6147d3b094f45a1d87e5df7f4f053, \u003c 42d0791f8aa90382c22dbe0443712c78d1e9d212",
          "\u003e= c75afcd153f6147d3b094f45a1d87e5df7f4f053, \u003c 089f10b47843a86fa03a8c20799c9353660e5288",
          "\u003e= c75afcd153f6147d3b094f45a1d87e5df7f4f053, \u003c 361488984d668235438faac28635f3632351407f",
          "\u003e= c75afcd153f6147d3b094f45a1d87e5df7f4f053, \u003c 587a6a92b93ec314c583bbf747413af170d42540",
          "\u003e= c75afcd153f6147d3b094f45a1d87e5df7f4f053, \u003c 580f777d6d9fd07fc034bd1aeba5c30fd48871a2",
          "\u003e= c75afcd153f6147d3b094f45a1d87e5df7f4f053, \u003c 3f4ae5fab613dca01d6a2a8210dd832e009fcf47"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "42d0791f8aa90382c22dbe0443712c78d1e9d212",
          "089f10b47843a86fa03a8c20799c9353660e5288",
          "361488984d668235438faac28635f3632351407f",
          "587a6a92b93ec314c583bbf747413af170d42540",
          "580f777d6d9fd07fc034bd1aeba5c30fd48871a2",
          "3f4ae5fab613dca01d6a2a8210dd832e009fcf47"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "Linux",
        "product": "Linux",
        "ranges": [
          "2.6.36"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "0",
          "6.1.191",
          "6.6.160",
          "6.12.109",
          "6.18.50",
          "7.2.4",
          "7.3"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade Linux to 42d0791f8aa90382c22dbe0443712c78d1e9d212 or 089f10b47843a86fa03a8c20799c9353660e5288 or 361488984d668235438faac28635f3632351407f or 587a6a92b93ec314c583bbf747413af170d42540 or 580f777d6d9fd07fc034bd1aeba5c30fd48871a2 or 3f4ae5fab613dca01d6a2a8210dd832e009fcf47 or later.",
      "Upgrade Linux to 0 or 6.1.191 or 6.6.160 or 6.12.109 or 6.18.50 or 7.2.4 or 7.3 or later."
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
