{
  "id": "CVE-2026-87038",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-87038",
  "published_at": "2026-11-04T06:09:03.711Z",
  "title": "Time-of-check/time-of-use double fetch in the Zephyr i3c_transfer() syscall handler allows kernel-mode control-flow hijack from user mode",
  "vendor": "zephyrproject",
  "product": "zephyr",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "The user-mode verification handler for the i3c_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_i3c_transfer() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c, validated the caller-supplied struct i3c_device_desc in place instead of snapshotting it. It confirmed only that the descriptor was readable by the calling thread (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ()), read target-\u003ebus once to check it with K_SYSCALL_OBJ(), and then passed the caller's live pointer down. The implementation z_impl_i3c_transfer() re-reads target-\u003ebus from that user memory and dispatches through it as DEVICE_API_GET(i3c, target-\u003ebus)-\u003ei3c_xfers(...), so the bus that was validated is not necessarily the bus that is used. DEVICE_API_GET() performs no runtime type check outside CONFIG_DEVICE_API_ASSERT builds.\n\nOn a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and an I3C controller driver, a user thread that has been granted an I3C device object can exploit this with a second thread in the same memory domain: one thread calls i3c_transfer() while the other rewrites the bus field of the descriptor. The window between the check and the use spans the num_msgs validation, the message-array access check, a stack VLA allocation and a memcpy() of up to 32 struct i3c_msg, so the race is repeatable and can simply be retried until it lands.\n\nWhen the substitution succeeds, the kernel dereferences an attacker-chosen pointer as a struct device, loads a function pointer from the attacker-controlled api table and calls it in supervisor mode with attacker-influenced arguments. This yields kernel-mode code execution from an unprivileged user thread — a complete escape of the userspace memory-protection sandbox; lesser outcomes are an arbitrary two-level kernel read or a kernel fault. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or without an I3C driver, are unaffected.\n\nThe fix copies the descriptor into a kernel-stack local with k_usermode_from_copy(), validates the bus in that copy, and dispatches on the copy, so the validated value is provably the value used.",
  "cwe": "CWE-367",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "zephyrproject",
        "product": "zephyr",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 3.2.0, \u003c 4.3.2",
          "\u003e= 4.4.0, \u003c 4.5.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.3.2",
          "4.5.0"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.5.0 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/550437bc9efd7b733f13b9be73e77fd98858c8a2"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-86xj-2q6x-h82w"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
