{
  "id": "CVE-2026-80662",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-80662",
  "published_at": "2026-08-28T06:49:06.277Z",
  "title": "cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size",
  "vendor": "Linux",
  "product": "Linux",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.1,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size\n\nThe CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58\nbytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing\n64 bytes at offset 0x18.  CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512,\neight times the actual on-device size.\n\nheader_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the\nRAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes.\nThe cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE\n(512) bytes from its source.  For the CPER caller the source is\nstruct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a\nstack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes\nof kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can\nread it via tracefs.\n\nSet CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it,\nbringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords.  Userspace tools\nsuch as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32)\nheader_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event.  Add\nCXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event\n__array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI.  Both callers now pass a\nzero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only\nthe first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware;\nthe remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring\nbuffer layout intact.\n\n[ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ]",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.1
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "Linux",
        "product": "Linux",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9, \u003c d031617045dc743764ea574432e5c2a3757b4e57",
          "\u003e= 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9, \u003c e3e8f3b760bcf6a4b3aec412015b74b578729006",
          "\u003e= 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9, \u003c 6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d",
          "\u003e= 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9, \u003c fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528",
          "\u003e= 2905cb5236cba63a5dc8a83752dcc31f3cc819f9, \u003c c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "d031617045dc743764ea574432e5c2a3757b4e57",
          "e3e8f3b760bcf6a4b3aec412015b74b578729006",
          "6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d",
          "fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528",
          "c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "Linux",
        "product": "Linux",
        "ranges": [
          "6.2"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "0",
          "6.6.160",
          "6.12.114",
          "6.18.42",
          "7.1.5",
          "7.2"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade Linux to d031617045dc743764ea574432e5c2a3757b4e57 or e3e8f3b760bcf6a4b3aec412015b74b578729006 or 6fc1919a6f2ed541484dd1f6cd93374044f8fd3d or fc5eb0962a5e50d64e711817cc24d67df2d90528 or c268f949e219f9e179558e836f457f6c5fbec416 or later.",
      "Upgrade Linux to 0 or 6.6.160 or 6.12.114 or 6.18.42 or 7.1.5 or 7.2 or later."
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
