{
  "id": "CVE-2026-78551",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-78551",
  "published_at": "2026-08-24T19:20:03.145Z",
  "title": "RansomLook Login Endpoint Allows Timing-Based Username Enumeration and Unthrottled Authentication Attempts",
  "vendor": "ransomlook",
  "product": "ransomlook",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.8,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "RansomLook contains multiple weaknesses in its authentication endpoint that allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate valid usernames, perform unrestricted password-guessing attacks, and potentially exhaust application worker resources.\n\nFor local authentication, the login implementation previously checked whether a submitted username existed before invoking the password hash verification function. Requests containing a nonexistent username therefore returned significantly faster than requests for valid accounts, for which the computationally expensive password verification routine was executed. A remote attacker could measure these response-time differences to determine which usernames correspond to valid RansomLook accounts.\n\nIn addition, the /login endpoint did not restrict the number or frequency of failed authentication attempts. An attacker could consequently perform password brute-force, dictionary, password-spraying, or credential-stuffing attacks against known accounts without server-side throttling. For valid usernames, each authentication attempt also invokes the password key-derivation function, which consumes a significant amount of CPU time. A sufficiently high rate of login attempts could therefore occupy the application's synchronous Gunicorn workers and cause a denial of service affecting the entire application.\n\nThe issue has been addressed by always performing password verification using a randomly generated dummy password hash when the supplied username does not exist, eliminating the username-dependent timing discrepancy. Failed authentication attempts are additionally rate-limited per client IP address using Valkey/Redis, with five failed attempts within five minutes resulting in a one-hour block. The reverse-proxy configuration was also updated so that the application derives the client address from a trusted X-Forwarded-For value that cannot be overridden by a client-supplied header.",
  "cwe": "CWE-307",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "ransomlook",
        "product": "ransomlook",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c= 2.0.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": null
      }
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/RansomLook/RansomLook/commit/8602740347b0e928ad9fbaf5bc6ff242337dec6b"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
