{
  "id": "CVE-2026-71886",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-71886",
  "published_at": "2026-10-03T08:46:33.868Z",
  "title": "OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority",
  "vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.",
  "product": "BC-JAVA",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.2,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.",
  "cwe": "CWE-863",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.2
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.",
        "product": "BC-JAVA",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 1.81, \u003c 1.86"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "1.86"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade BC-JAVA to 1.86 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071886"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/f0d5c8535aeff3f34b7b6b6289ee78c2ea36a3fb"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
