{
  "id": "CVE-2026-55177",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-55177",
  "published_at": "2026-09-30T16:25:02.258Z",
  "title": "CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard",
  "vendor": "dfpc-coe",
  "product": "CloudTAK",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.6,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: \u003cmessage\u003e. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.",
  "cwe": "CWE-918",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.6
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "dfpc-coe",
        "product": "CloudTAK",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c 13.10.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "13.10.0"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade CloudTAK to 13.10.0 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/security/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Release notes",
        "url": "https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/releases/tag/v13.10.0"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
