{
  "id": "CVE-2026-19673",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-19673",
  "published_at": "2026-10-14T16:45:57.967Z",
  "title": "Out-of-bounds read and net_buf length underflow in Zephyr Ethernet L2 when parsing a truncated VLAN header",
  "vendor": "zephyrproject",
  "product": "zephyr",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.1,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a received frame holds a plain 14-byte struct net_eth_hdr. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the same buffer is reinterpreted as the 18-byte struct net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length: the VLAN TCI and the inner ethertype are read from offsets 14..17, past pkt-\u003ebuffer-\u003elen, and hdr_len is raised to 18 so the subsequent net_buf_pull() removes more bytes than the buffer holds.\n\nA single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers this. No knowledge of the node's VLAN configuration is needed: net_eth_get_vlan_iface() returns the base interface for the priority tag 0, and a broadcast destination address satisfies the \"frame is for me\" test, so a 16-byte broadcast frame with ethertype 0x8100 and TCI 0x0000 reaches the pull. Nothing in the receive path enforces the 60-byte Ethernet minimum — the USB CDC ECM and CDC NCM gadget classes in particular hand host-supplied frames of any non-zero length straight to net_recv_data().\n\nWith assertions enabled, net_buf_simple_pull() asserts and the node panics. In a production build (assertions and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING off) the uint16_t buffer length underflows to 65534 and buf-\u003edata is advanced past the end of the fragment's storage, so every later parser reads far outside the buffer and any net_buf_add() on that fragment computes tailroom from the underflowed length. The result is a reliable remote denial of service and out-of-bounds access with information-disclosure and corruption potential.\n\nOnly configurations built with CONFIG_NET_VLAN=y that have a VLAN enabled on the receiving Ethernet interface, and whose MAC does not strip VLAN tags in hardware (ETHERNET_HW_VLAN_TAG_STRIP), are affected. The fix rejects the frame before the tag is read, so hdr_len is thereafter either 14 or 18 with both sizes validated against pkt-\u003ebuffer-\u003elen.",
  "cwe": "CWE-125",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.1
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "zephyrproject",
        "product": "zephyr",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 1.12.0, \u003c 4.5.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.5.0"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade zephyr to 4.5.0 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/fd3c6fedf6b639977a80e52b680b15672c31f3ef"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-79rf-rwff-f4vg"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
