{
  "id": "CVE-2026-19184",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-19184",
  "published_at": "2026-10-05T08:06:22.681Z",
  "title": "Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch",
  "vendor": "zephyrproject",
  "product": "zephyr",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.4,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence-\u003ebuffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data-\u003eresults_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as \"large enough\" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.\n\nadc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler — which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions — to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.\n\nThe overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence-\u003eoptions-\u003eextra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled — sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.\n\nThe fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written.",
  "cwe": "CWE-787",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.4
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "zephyrproject",
        "product": "zephyr",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 3.7.0, \u003c 4.3.2",
          "\u003e= 4.4.0, \u003c 4.5.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.3.2",
          "4.5.0"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.5.0 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
