{
  "id": "CVE-2026-18438",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-18438",
  "published_at": "2026-08-15T09:25:18.17Z",
  "title": "Templately \u003c= 3.7.1 - Authenticated (Contributor+) Arbitrary File Upload to Remote Code Execution via Gutenberg Cloud Import Attachment Filename Mismatch",
  "vendor": "wpdevteam",
  "product": "Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud!",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.8,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "The Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud! plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1 via the fetch_remote_file function. This is due to a filename validation/destination mismatch in fetch_remote_file, where file type validation is performed against the attacker-controlled Content-Disposition filename rather than the URL-path-derived destination filename. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to execute code on the server. A GIF+PHP polyglot file passes wp_check_filetype_and_ext validation as image/gif via the Content-Disposition filename, while the actual destination path is written with a .php extension derived from the URL path, bypassing the unfiltered_upload capability gate entirely. The affected endpoints are reachable at this privilege level because Templately's entire REST API — including the cloud import endpoints used in this attack (/templately/v1/clouds/upload and /templately/v1/insert) — is authorized only by a current_user_can('delete_posts') check, with no administrator or manage_options capability requirement. The same permission gate also allows a contributor to overwrite the site's global Templately cloud connection via the /templately/v1/login endpoint with global_signin set to true. A complete remediation should both correct fetch_remote_file to validate the file type against the actual destination filename rather than the Content-Disposition header (and avoid deriving the write path from the request URL), and restrict state-changing Templately REST routes to an appropriate administrator-level capability.",
  "cwe": "CWE-434",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "wpdevteam",
        "product": "Templately – Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg Template Library: 6500+ Free \u0026 Pro Ready Templates And Cloud!",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c= 3.7.1"
        ],
        "fixed_in": null
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
