{
  "id": "CVE-2026-18415",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-18415",
  "published_at": "2026-09-28T20:00:01.312Z",
  "title": "Out-of-bounds write in the IEEE 802.15.4 L2 transmit path for oversized non-6LoWPAN frames",
  "vendor": "zephyrproject",
  "product": "zephyr",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.1,
    "source": "nvd",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "ieee802154_send() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154.c copies the outgoing packet into a single fixed 125-byte transmit buffer (tx_frame_buf_pool, sized IEEE802154_MTU). In builds with CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_FRAGMENT enabled (the default whenever CONFIG_NET_6LO is set), the branch taken when 6LoWPAN fragmentation is not required performed an unchecked net_buf_add_mem(frame_buf, pkt_buf-\u003edata, pkt_buf-\u003elen). The only guard was __ASSERT_NO_MSG() inside net_buf_simple_add(), which is compiled out without CONFIG_ASSERT, so an oversized packet silently overran the frame buffer.\n\nThe defect is not reachable from the radio: for NET_AF_INET6 packets ieee802154_6lo_encode_pkt() compares the whole packet length against IEEE802154_MTU and takes the fragmentation path when it does not fit, so every buffer copied on the unfragmented branch is within bounds. It is reachable through NET_AF_PACKET sockets bound to an 802.15.4 interface: for NET_SOCK_RAW the 6LoWPAN block is skipped entirely and for NET_SOCK_DGRAM it returns early on the address-family test, leaving no length validation anywhere on the transmit path (net_context_sendto() and net_if_tx() apply none, and pkt_buffer_length() does not clamp the allocation for this L2).\n\nAn application — or, in a CONFIG_USERSPACE build, an unprivileged application thread using the zsock_socket()/zsock_sendto() syscalls — can therefore drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of chosen bytes past the 125-byte pool buffer. With the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE of 128 bytes the overrun is bounded to roughly ll_hdr_len + 3 bytes; with CONFIG_NET_BUF_VARIABLE_DATA_SIZE a single storage buffer can be as large as CONFIG_NET_PKT_BUF_TX_DATA_POOL_SIZE, making the overrun far larger. The consequence is corruption of memory adjacent to the pool, with a crash or further compromise of kernel state as the practical impact.\n\nThe fix validates ll_hdr_len + net_pkt_get_len(pkt) + authtag_len against IEEE802154_MTU before any copy and adds a tailroom-checking copy_pkt_to_frame() helper that returns -EMSGSIZE instead of overrunning the buffer. The same change also linearizes the whole net_buf chain into one MAC frame, so packet storage boundaries no longer become frame boundaries on the wire.",
  "cwe": "CWE-787",
  "cpes": [
    "cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
  ],
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 6.3,
    "nvd": 7.1
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "zephyrproject",
        "product": "zephyr",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 3.2.0, \u003c 4.3.2",
          "\u003e= 4.4.0, \u003c 4.4.2"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.3.2",
          "4.4.2"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.4.2 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3d4c6177d2dbd77d12d9b14cd75a00cdbd826227"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j76j-jrjc-xgvp"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
