{
  "id": "CVE-2026-16760",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-16760",
  "published_at": "2026-10-30T21:16:31.353Z",
  "title": "Fickling check_safety() bypass: likely_safe_imports grants module-origin trust to unvalidated standard library callables",
  "vendor": "trailofbits",
  "product": "fickling",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.8,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "In Trail of Bits fickling through 0.1.12, the _process_import() method in fickle.py adds an imported name to the likely_safe_imports set whenever the source module is present in sys.stdlib_module_names and the name is absent from the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist, without inspecting what the name resolves to or how it behaves. The OvertlyBadEvals analysis pass in analysis.py then unconditionally skips any call whose function name appears in likely_safe_imports, including calls that would otherwise be flagged as overtly dangerous. As a result, any callable reachable through a non-blocked standard library module inherits module-level trust regardless of its own behavior, and check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE with zero findings for pickle payloads that reach code execution or file write through such callables. Demonstrated primitives: dataclasses._create_fn, which passes an attacker-controlled function body to exec() and yields arbitrary code execution on Python 3.7 through 3.12 (the internal _create_fn function was removed in Python 3.13); mailcap.findmatch, which internally calls os.system() on a test command taken from an attacker-controlled caps dictionary, yielding arbitrary code execution on Python versions through 3.12 (the mailcap module was removed in Python 3.13); and readline.add_history() followed by readline.write_history_file(), which writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path (POSIX platforms, where the readline module is available). fickling.load() chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, so a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed with the privileges of the victim process. The root cause is the inference of callable safety from module origin; it is independent of, and separately fixable from, the dotted __qualname__ resolution weakness tracked as CVE-2026-118938, which this advisory does not address. As of 2026-10-30 the three demonstrated modules were added to UNSAFE_IMPORTS on the vendor master branch (commit d011709) pending release; released versions through 0.1.12 remain affected, and the module-origin trust root cause persists, as demonstrated by the related CVE-2026-118938 remaining exploitable on that same build.",
  "cwe": "CWE-693",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "trailofbits",
        "product": "fickling",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c= 0.1.12"
        ],
        "fixed_in": null
      }
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/d011709"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
