{
  "id": "CVE-2026-14208",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-14208",
  "published_at": "2026-08-21T10:51:07.262Z",
  "title": "Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure DLL Permissions in Remote Utilities Host \u003c=7.7.3.0",
  "vendor": "Remote Utilities Pte. Ltd.",
  "product": "Remote Utilities Host",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.3,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "Remote Utilities Host \u003c=7.7.3.0 sets insecure ACLs on all DLL files in the installation directory (C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Remote Utilities - Host\\), granting FULL CONTROL (F) to the built-in Everyone group (BUILTIN\\Everyone, S-1-1-0). A Windows service running as NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM loads DLLs from this directory. The DLLs are file-locked at runtime, but a race window exists when the service is stopped (e.g. during a software update or following a crash), during which a local unprivileged attacker can replace a DLL with a malicious payload. Upon service restart, the payload executes as NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The DLL confirmed as actively loaded during testing is libasset32.dll. Additional DLLs in the same directory (eventmsg.dll, libcodec32.dll, vp8encoder.dll, vp8decoder.dll, webmvorbisdecoder.dll, webmvorbisencoder.dll, webmmux.dll) share identical insecure permissions.",
  "cwe": "CWE-732",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.3
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "Remote Utilities Pte. Ltd.",
        "product": "Remote Utilities Host",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c= 7.7.3.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": null
      }
    ],
    "solutions": [
      "*  Remove Everyone:(F) ACL from all DLL files under the installation directory. Restrict to: SYSTEM (Full Control), Administrators (Full Control), Users/Authenticated Users (Read \u0026 Execute). Enforce recursively in installer, update routine, and repair mechanism.\n  *  Implement cryptographic signature verification of all loaded DLLs at service startup.\n  *  Use atomic DLL replacement during updates (write to temp path, verify signature, rename)."
    ],
    "workarounds": [
      "Manually correct DLL ACLs using icacls: icacls \"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Remote Utilities - Host\\*.dll\" /remove \"Everyone\" /grant \"BUILTIN\\Users:(RX)\" /grant \"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(F)\" /grant \"BUILTIN\\Administrators:(F)\""
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://www.remoteutilities.com/product/release-notes.php#windows"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
