{
  "id": "CVE-2026-125275",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-125275",
  "published_at": "2026-11-17T02:54:23.81Z",
  "title": "A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever",
  "vendor": "nerves-hub",
  "product": "nerves_hub_web",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.2,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.\n\nThe device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.\n\nThis issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.",
  "cwe": "CWE-835",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.2
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "nerves-hub",
        "product": "nerves_hub_web",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 1.0.0, \u003c 2.5.4"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "2.5.4"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "nerves-hub",
        "product": "nerves_hub_web",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 1.0.0, \u003c 2.5.4"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "2.5.4"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "nerves-hub",
        "product": "nerves_hub_web",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9, \u003c 064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade nerves_hub_web to 2.5.4 or later.",
      "Upgrade nerves_hub_web to 2.5.4 or later.",
      "Upgrade nerves_hub_web to 064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58 or later."
    ],
    "workarounds": [
      "Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. A certificate from an unregistered CA is then refused once and the handshake ends. Devices whose certificate or CA is registered in NervesHub continue to connect.\n\nRestarting a node ends the handshakes that are already stuck on it."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-8j48-4mg5-7v6v"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
