{
  "id": "CVE-2026-12522",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-12522",
  "published_at": "2026-08-19T20:37:35.638Z",
  "title": "Stack buffer overflow in Zephyr hl7800 modem driver parsing network-supplied +CGCONTRDP address fields",
  "vendor": "zephyrproject",
  "product": "zephyr",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.8,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": {
    "category": "Router / network device",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "reason": "product or title mentions \"modem\""
  },
  "description": "The HL7800 cellular modem driver's +CGCONTRDP: response handler on_cmd_atcmdinfo_ipaddr() in drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl7800.c parses the PDP-context dynamic parameters (local address, subnet mask, gateway, and DNS servers) that the cellular network assigns to the device. The response is linearized into a 256-byte stack buffer, after which each address field length is computed from comma/. delimiter positions in the network-supplied data and used directly as the length argument to strncpy() into the fixed 64-byte stack buffer temp_addr_str (and the 16-byte iface_ctx.dns_v4_string).\n\nBecause the field length is derived from attacker-controlled delimiter positions and was not bounded against the destination buffer, a single field can be far larger than 64 bytes. A malicious or impersonated cellular network (for example a rogue base station) can return a crafted +CGCONTRDP response with an overlong address field, causing strncpy() to write past temp_addr_str on the modem worker thread's stack, plus an out-of-bounds NUL write at temp_addr_str[addr_len].\n\nNo device-side privileges or user interaction are required: the device itself issues the AT+CGCONTRDP=1 query during normal network attach and parses whatever the network returns. The overflow corrupts adjacent stack memory in supervisor context, yielding at minimum a remotely triggerable crash and potentially control-flow hijacking on targets without stack protection.\n\nThe fix bounds every field length against its destination buffer (temp_addr_str and dns_v4_string) before each copy, rejecting overlong fields.",
  "cwe": "CWE-787",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "zephyrproject",
        "product": "zephyr",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 2.4.0, \u003c 4.3.2",
          "\u003e= 4.4.0, \u003c 4.4.2"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4.3.2",
          "4.4.2"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade zephyr to 4.3.2 or 4.4.2 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/a1cbced64181bc0bdf95e1fd7118f2bb70cf679b"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-hchc-6489-w66v"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
