{
  "id": "CVE-2026-123974",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-123974",
  "published_at": "2026-11-06T19:52:16.058Z",
  "title": "pytorch/serve: Local privilege escalation through insecure temporary path",
  "vendor": "PyTorch",
  "product": "TorchServe",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.8,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "In all versions of PyTorch's TorchServe, a predictable extraction directory in /tmp lets a local user swap the model handler and run code as the TorchServe service account leading to local privilege escalation.",
  "cwe": "CWE-379",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.8
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "PyTorch",
        "product": "TorchServe",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c *"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "*"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "solutions": [
      "The project is archived and currently no permanent solution is scheduled for release. See workaround section."
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade TorchServe to * or later."
    ],
    "workarounds": [
      "Three independent fixes:\n\n\n  *  Set TEMP (or pass -Djava.io.tmpdir) to a directory the service account owns and that is not world-writable.\n  *  Harden the systemd unit with PrivateTmp=yes, so /tmp is namespaced per service.\n  *  At the code level, extract into a directory owned by the service account and refuse to reuse a pre-existing extraction root that the service does not own, instead of forceMkdir-ing into whatever is already there."
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
