{
  "id": "CVE-2026-120307",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-120307",
  "published_at": "2026-11-01T12:49:51.981Z",
  "title": "Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths",
  "vendor": "beam-cloud",
  "product": "Beta9 worker",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 9.9,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.",
  "cwe": "CWE-22",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 9.9
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "beam-cloud",
        "product": "Beta9 worker",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c 0.1.756"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "0.1.756"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "solutions": [
      "Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later. Sandbox file APIs and workspace sync use os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory segments and symbolic links stay inside the container root or the mount source. File operations refuse read-only mounts and do not write through a symlink swapped in after path resolution. The fix is commit a28bf12 (pull request 1897), released as worker-0.1.756 on 2026-09-15."
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/pull/1897"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/commit/a28bf12cf0007c792a25d8ed282b4e8bf6f30393"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Release notes",
        "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/worker-0.1.756"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
