{
  "id": "CVE-2026-119446",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-119446",
  "published_at": "2026-11-10T10:44:15.336Z",
  "title": "Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token",
  "vendor": "nerves-hub",
  "product": "nerves_hub_web",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 9.4,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/\u003ctoken\u003e returns it to whoever started the login.\n\nThe confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves.\n\nThis issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.",
  "cwe": "CWE-384",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 9.4
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "nerves-hub",
        "product": "nerves_hub_web",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 2.5.0, \u003c 2.5.3"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "2.5.3"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "nerves-hub",
        "product": "nerves_hub_web",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 2.5.0, \u003c 2.5.3"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "2.5.3"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "nerves-hub",
        "product": "nerves_hub_web",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564, \u003c 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "solutions": [
      "Upgrading does not revoke tokens already handed out. A token from a CLI login is an ordinary API token with a note the client chose, so one an attacker obtained looks like any other. After upgrading, users should review their API tokens on the account page and delete any they do not recognise."
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade nerves_hub_web to 2.5.3 or later.",
      "Upgrade nerves_hub_web to 2.5.3 or later.",
      "Upgrade nerves_hub_web to 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508 or later."
    ],
    "workarounds": [
      "Block POST /api/auth/cli_session at the reverse proxy until the upgrade. It is the only entry point that creates a CLI login, so no link can be produced while it is blocked. CLIs can still sign in with an email and password (nh user auth, POST /api/users/auth), or use an API token created on the account page."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-9vr9-463q-46qp"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
