{
  "id": "CVE-2026-119215",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-119215",
  "published_at": "2026-11-03T15:46:32.432Z",
  "title": "AshAuthentication TOTP setup lets a user install their own authenticator secret on another user's account",
  "vendor": "team-alembic",
  "product": "ash_authentication",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.6,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows a user with an account to install a TOTP secret they control on another user's account, and then sign in as that user or hold their second factor.\n\nAshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange verified a setup token but did not check that it was issued to the record being confirmed, so an attacker's own pending secret could be confirmed onto another user's record. The TOTP setup changes, ConfirmSetupChange, GeneratePendingSetupChange and GenerateSecretChange, also marked their changesets as AshAuthentication interactions, which the standard AshAuthenticationInteraction policy bypass lets through. A policy limiting setup and confirm_setup to the actor's own record therefore never ran when an application exposed those actions by record key, and a direct setup call on another user's record returned that user's pending secret and setup token.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.16.",
  "cwe": "CWE-639",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.6
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "team-alembic",
        "product": "ash_authentication",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 5.0.0-rc.0, \u003c 5.0.0-rc.16"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "5.0.0-rc.16"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "team-alembic",
        "product": "ash_authentication",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 6e7a880698614887527a87df206b4eb0c0fbd8c1, \u003c 4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade ash_authentication to 5.0.0-rc.16 or later.",
      "Upgrade ash_authentication to 4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574 or later."
    ],
    "workarounds": [
      "Do not expose setup or confirm_setup on a record the caller chooses. Call them through AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.Actions with the signed-in user, as the built-in routes do."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-gx67-694c-655c"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/6e7a880698614887527a87df206b4eb0c0fbd8c1"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
