{
  "id": "CVE-2026-115863",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-115863",
  "published_at": "2026-10-23T17:35:18.517Z",
  "vendor": "ConnMan",
  "product": "ConnMan",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.6,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1025) bytes from a DHCPv6 DOMAIN_LIST (option 24) value into a 1026-byte stack buffer dns_name regardless of the actual option length, then walks DNS labels with an unbounded \"c += jump + 1\" loop. A crafted DHCPv6 REPLY with a DOMAIN_LIST option of \u003e= 1025 non-zero bytes makes the label walk leave the buffer and read/write '.' past its end in attacker-chosen strides. An on-link attacker can trigger this without authentication via a forged Router Advertisement (O=1) and a forged DHCPv6 REPLY matching xid/CLIENTID with a long DOMAIN_LIST. The impact is unauthenticated on-link crash of connmand (runs as root). This was introduced in bb06c47.",
  "cwe": "CWE-121",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.6
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "ConnMan",
        "product": "ConnMan",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c= 2.0"
        ],
        "fixed_in": null
      }
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=bb06c47101ca243fa5c04fb4b03fe2a12420d280"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
