{
  "id": "CVE-2026-115477",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-115477",
  "published_at": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
  "title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP",
  "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
  "product": "obsidian-tc",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 7.1,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.",
  "cwe": "CWE-285",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 7.1
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
        "product": "obsidian-tc",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 1.13.0, \u003c 1.31.4"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "1.31.4"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade obsidian-tc to 1.31.4 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Release notes",
        "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Release notes",
        "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
