{
  "id": "CVE-2026-114611",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-114611",
  "published_at": "2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z",
  "title": "OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack",
  "vendor": "schorschii",
  "product": "OCO-Server",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 9.1,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=\u003cserial\u003e` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.",
  "cwe": "CWE-295",
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 9.1
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "schorschii",
        "product": "OCO-Server",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003c 1.2.3"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "1.2.3"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade OCO-Server to 1.2.3 or later."
    ],
    "references": [
      {
        "kind": "Vendor advisory",
        "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404"
      },
      {
        "kind": "Patch",
        "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df"
      }
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
